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Challenging Changing Legal Definitions of Family
in Same-Sex Domestic Violence
Shannon Little*
I. INTRODUCTION
One called repeatedly, threatening to "ruin" the victim by telling
scandalous stories about the victim's sexual practices and health to police,
family, friends, and colleagues.' Another's threat was more physical, and it
included brandishing a knife, grabbing the victim's face, and pushing.2
Another engaged in an all-out battle: punching the victim in the face,
stomach, and head, and kicking the victim in the shins.3 The situations
vary, but the common thread is that the perpetrators and the victims were
men in homosexual relationships, and law enforcement and the legal
structures designed to end domestic violence failed the victims.
Domestic violence law has made great strides from the time when
husbands were allowed to beat their wives with "a switch no larger than his
thumb."4 Courts no longer explicitly hold that the best response to violence
is to "draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to
forget and forgive.",5  Federal and state criminal/civil laws outlaw and
attempt to prevent domestic violence, also referred to as "intimate partner
violence," "domestic abuse," and "partner abuse."6  In the 1970s, the
feminist movement focused on developing an understanding of domestic
violence as a product of patriarchy and devoted energy to funding and
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008; University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
B.A., 2000, Journalism, American University, 2000. The Author served as the Executive
Symposium Editor for HWLTs 2008 symposium, "Family Frontiers: Emerging Legal Issues
in the Post-Nuclear Era." She would like to give special thanks to the members of the
Hastings Women 's Law Journal and Kristen Washburn and Connie Cabello of Bay Area
Legal Aid's Alameda County family law division.
1. Richardson v. Easterling, 878 A.2d 1212, 1215 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
2. Moore v. Bentley, No. 03-AP-1003, 2004 WL 2804785, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 2004).
3. DAVID ISLAND & PATRICK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LOVE
THEM: BATTERED GAY MEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 236-39 (Harrington Park Press 1991).
4. State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 44, 45 (1874).
5. Id. at 45.
6. Riyah Lilith, Reconsidering the Abuse that Dare Not Speak Its Name: Criticism of
Recent Legal Scholarship Regarding Same Gendered Domestic Violence, 7 MICH. J.
GENDER& L. 181, 182 (2001).
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staffing domestic violence shelters and working for the passage of
protective domestic violence laws. Recently, the vast majority of states
have broadened their domestic violence statutes to include non-married
heterosexual couples, dating relationships, children, and same-sex
relationships. 8 While laws have added language to cover the first three
situations, most state legislation has been amended to include same-sex
relationships by removing references to gender.
Though the attempt to include same-sex relationships within domestic
violence law is laudable, the perhaps unintended consequence has been to
remove the initial analysis of domestic violence as a product of patriarchy
and power. Same-sex relationships may exhibit a "gendered" character that
plays out in abuse. Moreover, forms of abuse and family situations unique
to same-sex relationships remain unaddressed by some states' laws.
Additionally, persistent homophobia in society and the legal system
disadvantages people in same-sex relationships who seek legal protection.
In order to provide adequate protection and resources for victims and
survivors of domestic violence who are in same-sex relationships,
legislatures must revisit their domestic violence laws. Laws should be
amended to include explicit language incorporating relationships of all
types and to account for broader understandings of the abusive acts
themselves.
This Note will first discuss the prevalence of, and unique issues raised
by, same-sex domestic violence. It will then analyze amendments to
domestic violence laws to incorporate same-sex couples and non-spousal
situations. The Note goes on to use case studies to show how these laws
have not fulfilled their aims. Finally, this Note will suggest alternative
language that might better address domestic violence in same-sex
relationships.
II. REALITIES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY
The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community is by
no means immune from domestic violence. Studies suggest that domestic
violence occurs in LGBT relationships at about the same rate as
heterosexual relationships: Approximately eleven percent of lesbian and
gay male relationships self-report domestic violence. 9 A recent survey in
Hong Kong found that about sixteen percent of gays and lesbians
experienced domestic abuse, compared to 9.6 percent of heterosexual
7. Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1841, 1851-52 (2006).
8. Id. at 1857-58.
9. Joanna Bunker Rohrbaugh, Domestic Violence in Same-Gender Relationships, 44
FAM. CT. REV. 287, 290 (2006).
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relationships.' 0 Other studies compared rates within the LGBT community
and found higher rates of domestic violence among gay males than
lesbians." While yet another study concluded that violence is more likely
to be perpetrated by men regardless of whether they are in same-sex or
opposite-sex relationships. 12 For example, the 1997 report by the National
Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP), a network of twenty-four
community-based gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender anti-violence
organizations, found that women living with opposite-sex partners were
nearly twice as likely to report experiences with violence as were women
living with same-sex partners. 13  Similarly, men living with same-sex
partners were also almost twice as likely to report experiencing violence at
the hands of their partners than were men cohabiting with opposite-sex
partners. 14
Regardless of the exact numbers, there are thousands of people across
the country subject to same-sex partner abuse. The NCAVP compiled data
on 6523 incidents in eleven cities in 2003.'5 In San Francisco, Community
United Against Violence and Queer Asian Women's Services of the Asian
Women's Shelter issued a report documenting 366 incidents in 2005.16
Those numbers are likely to represent only a fraction of the actual
incidents. The NCAVP report notes that high numbers in Los Angeles may
be attributable to an active and capable anti-violence program and more
equitable legal treatment of LGBT domestic violence survivors. 7 Areas
with fewer resources for the LGBT community most likely have lower
reporting rates.
Victims and survivors of domestic violence in LGBT relationships may
have a very different experience and set of needs than those in heterosexual
relationships. Same-sex abuse can take new forms, such as threats to "out"
10. Gays 60 percent more prone to domestic violence, survey says, INDO-ASIAN
NEWS SERVICE (Hong Kong), Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://news.webindia123.com/
news/ar__showdetails.asp?id=702150875&cat=&n-date=20070215.
11. Lilith, supra note 6, at 199-200.
12. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, NCJ 181867 at 30, (July 2000). See also
KATHARINE BARTLETT, ANGELA HARRIS & DEBORAH RHODE, GENDER AND LAW, 627 (3rd.
ed. 2002).
13. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 12, at 627.
14. Id.
15. NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL
AND TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A 2003 UPDATE (2003), available at
http://www.ncavp.org/common/document-files/Reports/2003NCAVPDVRpt.pdf
[hereinafter NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS].
16. COMMUNITY UNITED AGAINST VIOLENCE & QUEER ASIAN WOMEN'S SERVICES,
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER SAN FRANCISCO 2005 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
REPORT SUMMARY: A REPORT FROM COMMUNITY UNITED AGAINST VIOLENCE AND QUEER
ASIAN WOMEN'S SERVICES (2007), available at http://www.cuav.org/docs/report%20-
%20st/o20lgbt%202005%20dv%20summary.pdf.
17. NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 15, at 3.
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a partner who is not public with her or his sexual identity.1 8 Sandra Lundy
has described homophobia as "an extra weapon in [the abuser's] arsenal of
terror."' 9 Because LGBT people may be more isolated from family or the
larger community, these victims may have few places to go for support.2°
Furthermore, the LGBT community itself may either ostracize a victim
who reports abuse or ignore the issue altogether.2' The community may
refuse to acknowledge abuse out of fear that doing so will affirm negative
stereotypes or detract from efforts to gain legal recognition for LGBT
relationships. Researchers also suggest that some lesbians have a
political objection to acknowledging that women can be abusers, since
doing so shatters the "utopian" view of womanhood.23
LGBT abuse victims may also have more difficulty accessing domestic
violence resources than heterosexual victims. LGBT victims may be less
willing to call police out of fear that they will face a homophobic reaction
from the authorities.24 A narrative about a violent incident between two
gay men vividly demonstrates the vulnerable position that a same-sex
victim may feel he or she is in: "I stand there, numbly staring at those two
officers, wondering if they think I've been beating Stephen, because he
looks absolutely terrified right now., 25 There are very few organizations
dedicated to serving male victims of domestic violence, and many women's
shelters will not take in lesbians, citing funding restrictions or the fear that
lesbians will be a disruptive presence.26 For these reasons, abuse is most
likely under-reported. In the year after it hired an advocate to specifically
address abuse in same-sex relationships, San Francisco's District
Attorney's office reported a sixty-seven percent increase in incidents of
violence in the LGBT community.27  This indicates that societal
homophobia creates a layer of oppression beyond that which an LGBT
victim may suffer from his or her abuser.
Violence in same-sex relationships also holds an awkward place within
common understandings of domestic violence. Where there is not a clear
gender difference, law enforcement or others within the legal system
cannot easily point to a "presumed" aggressor.28 Where two women are
18. Rohrbaugh, supra note 9, at 293.
19. Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse that Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of
Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in Massachusetts, 28 New Eng. L. Rev. 273, 282
(1993).
20. Id. at 285-86.
21. Id. at 286.
22. Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere
While Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 325, 326 (1999).
23. Lundy, supra note 19, at 286.
24. Knauer, supra note 22, at 348.
25. ISLAND & LETELLIER, supra note 3, at 237-38.
26. Lundy, supra note 19, at 287-88.
27. Knauer, supra note 22, at 330.
28. Id. at 333.
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involved, a battered women's shelter may struggle with whom to admit,
and advocates cannot follow the tenet that the woman should always be
believed.2 9 Lastly, domestic violence protections grew out of a feminist
movement focused on patriarchy and gender roles linked to biological
sex.30 Where maleness is not readily apparent and gender roles are non-
existent or less clear to an outside observer, it may be difficult to
incorporate a traditional understanding of domestic violence resulting from
patriarchy.
As a result of uncertainty about the aggressor in the situation, courts
often issue mutual restraining orders against both the LGBT abuser and the
person complaining of abuse, reflecting a notion that the situation is one of
mutual battering, where the violence is reciprocal and both partners are
abusers and victims. 3' This stems from a common misconception that
abuse in LGBT relationships is "just fighting. 32 Abusers may also exploit
this myth by convincing their victims that self-defense and battering are
synonymous, reinforcing feelings of guilt or self-doubt, or to obtain initial
restraining orders despite themselves being the true aggressor.33 Although
mutual battering is raised as a defense in heterosexual situations,
researchers argue that the problem is particularly pervasive in same-sex
relationships.34
III. GENDER-NEUTRAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAWS
EXTEND PROTECTION TO LGBT RELATIONSHIPS
Piecemeal judicial decisions and laws began to prohibit a husband from
beating his wife in the late nineteenth century.35 However, it was nearly
one hundred years later before state and federal lawmakers began to
seriously address issues of heterosexual domestic violence.36 Criminal
prosecution of abusers and civil protection orders ceased to be something
seen as a threat to family privacy and became a mainstream policy by the
mid- 1 980S. 37 Most states enacted laws covering married couples, and some
extended their laws to include opposite-sex couples living together or in a
marriage-like relationship.38
Since the mid-1980s, many states have amended their statutes to cover
broader classes of people, including those who are cohabiting but not
29. Knauer, supra note 22, at 334.
30. Id. at 334-35.
31. Lundy, supra note 19, at 283.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. See also Lilith, supra note 6, at 215.
35. Colker, supra note 7, at 1851.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1854.
38. Id. at 1856.
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married, those in dating relationships, and other family members.39 Many
statutes have become gender-neutral and encompass LGBT relationships.4n
However, five states - Delaware, Louisiana, North Carolina, Montana,
and South Carolina - restrict their domestic violence laws to opposite-sex
parties.41 For example, Delaware's civil statute covers "family," defined as
husband and wife or cohabiting opposite-sex couple with a child in
common, stepparents or stepchildren, or other relatives related by blood. 2
The statute also covers former spouses or couples with children in
common, regardless of whether they live together.43 While no cases
relating to same-sex domestic violence were found, the definition of family
was read not to include stepgrandfathers, resulting in the overturning of a
conviction for offensive touching by such a relative against his
stepgranddaughter4n The court's reluctance to include an extended family
member in its definition of "family" suggests that it will be unwilling to
stretch the statute's language to include same-sex couples. Delaware's
criminal statute offers a broader definition; it includes persons who
cohabitated at the time of the offense, and has no requirement that the
45parties be of the opposite sex.
Louisiana's civil and criminal codes use a definition of "household
member" limited to opposite-sex parties or children.46 North Carolina
follows a pattern similar to Delaware, restricting civil protections to
opposite-sex partners and providing criminal remedies only if the parties
live or have lived as if married. 7 Montana's civil and criminal laws extend
to spouses or former spouses, persons with a child in common, and current
or former long-term dating partners of the opposite sex.4 8 South Carolina's
civil and criminal domestic violence statutes cover spouses, former
spouses, parties with children in common, or opposite-sex parties who live
or have lived together. 49  All five of these states have statutory or
constitutional language defining marriage as between members of the
opposite sex.50
39. Colker, supra note 7, at 1886-98.
40. Id.
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(12) (2008); LA. REV. ST. ANN. § 14:35.3 (B)(2)
(2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(b)(6) (2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(2)(b) (2007);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (1985 & Supp. 2007).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(12) (2008).
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(2)(b) (2008).
44. Walt v. State, 727 A.2d 836, 840 (Del. 1999).
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3906 (2007).
46. LA. REV. ST. ANN. § 14:35.3 (B)(2) (2007).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1(a) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(b)(6) (2005).
48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(2)(b) (2007).
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (1985 & Supp. 2007).
50. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEG., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS (2007), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/
samesex.htm.
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The remaining states use statutory language that could be construed to
cover same-sex relationships. Many statutes extend to relationships that
are "spouse-like," using that exact language, or require a long-term dating
relationship, taking factors such as shared finances into account.51 The
focus on marital relationships in these laws is a natural outgrowth of
arguments made in the 1970s that domestic violence should be criminalized
because it violates the important institution of family.52 When domestic
violence laws were first enacted, only the more progressive states extended
protections to unmarried, heterosexual women.53 As they have become
gender-neutral, many laws retain the focus on a committed, marriage-like
relationship. For example, Indiana covers those who are "similarly situated
to a spouse," and Massachusetts requires that parties be in a "substantive
dating or engagement relationship. 4  Other states have a cohabitation
requirement, similar to what is required for criminal liability in Delaware. 55
States also vary, although to a lesser extent, in the type of abuse their
domestic violence laws cover. Some states list explicit offenses and
include a residual clause under which courts can exercise discretion. For
example, Delaware's family courts have jurisdiction over abuse, defined as
physical assault, threats of such assault, property destruction, conduct
leading to emotional distress, trespass, and "any other conduct which a
reasonable person under the circumstances would find threatening or
harmful. 56 Louisiana civil domestic violence protections extend to any
physical or sexual abuse and any "abuse against the person," as defined by
the state's criminal code; but protections are not limited to offenses defined
in those sections.57 Indiana more rigidly defines domestic violence as
physical or sexual assault or threat thereof, or stalking.58 California defines
abuse as bodily injury or threat thereof, or sexual assault and references an
explicit list of abusive behaviors: molesting; attacking; striking; stalking;
threatening; sexually assaulting; battering; harassing; telephoning,
including, but not limited to, annoying telephone calls; destroying personal
property; contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise;
coming within a specified distance of; or disturbing the peace.59 In
California, therefore, the abuser's conduct need not result in physical injury
nor be inherently criminal.6°
51. Colker, supra note 7, at 1859.
52. Id. at 1856.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1859.
55. Id. at 1861.
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(1) (2008).
57. LA. REV. ST. ANN. § 46-2132 (West 2006).
58. IND. CODE ANN.§ 34-6-2-34.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
59. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203 (West 2004).
60. Conness v. Satram, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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Individual states have the bulk of oversight of domestic violence
protections. However, the federal Violence Against Women Act of 1993
creates federal criminal offenses for traveling across state lines intending to
kill, injure, harass, or intimidate a "spouse, intimate partner, or dating
partner."61 The statute also prohibits causing the victim to travel across
state lines through force, coercion or fraud, and increases punishment
where the perpetrator has committed the crime of stalking or violated a
state protective order. 62 The reference to "dating partner" was added by a
2006 amendment, as the 1993 law only encompassed spouses or intimate
partners. 63 While the federal law may be among the less-rigidly defined
laws as to whom it will cover, it is restricted by the fact that it can only
cover abuse that relates to interstate travel (or across tribal or maritime
land).
IV. AT WHAT COST? SHORTFALLS OF A GENDER-
NEUTRAL SYSTEM
While the vast majority of state courts now have jurisdiction over
same-sex domestic violence, there are several ways in which the laws are
less protective of the LGBT community than they are of heterosexual
relationships. The legal system may be ill-equipped to deal with the types
of abuse or vulnerability that can arise in LGBT relationships. Law
enforcement and the courts may hold particular biases that prevent them
from reaching good decisions in cases of abuse. Finally, there are potential
problems with constitutionality where laws use vague language to cover
same-sex relationships. The following section will address each of these
issues in turn.
It should first be noted that even a perfect law will be unable to prevent
the occurrence of all domestic abuse. Moreover, issuance of a civil
protective order is by no means a guarantee that the survivor will not be
abused again. Unfortunately, there are dozens of readily available
examples of cases in which a domestic violence restraining order has done
little to protect a victim from further, even fatal, abuse.64
In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
a state law mandating arrests for restraining order violations did not create
a right of enforcement.65 In Castle Rock, the plaintiff, Jessica Gonzales,
obtained a restraining order against her estranged husband.66 Language
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (2006).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a)(2) (2006); 18 U.S.C. 2261 (b)(6) (2006).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000 & Supp. 2007), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-162, §
116(a)(1) (Supp. 2006).
64. See, e.g. Ivy v. State, No. A-7744, 2003 Alaska App. LEXIS 12, at *2-3 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2003); People v. Rogers, 68 P.3d 486, 493 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Ennis v. State,
137 P.3d 1095, 1098 (Nev. 2006).
65. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005).
66. Id. at 751.
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printed on the back of the order notified police that they should use "every
reasonable means to enforce [the] restraining order. You shall arrest...
the restrained person when you have information amounting to probable
cause that the restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any
provision of this order." 67  One afternoon Gonzales's husband took the
couple's three daughters, in violation of the visitation schedule set by the
restraining order.68 Gonzales called the police, who instructed her to wait
several hours to see if her husband brought the girls back.69 Gonzales
subsequently called the police three more times and went to the station, but
was unable to inspire them to take any action.70 At 3:20 A.M., Gonzales's
husband arrived at the station and opened fire with a semi-automatic gun he
had bought that evening. 7' The police returned his gunfire, killing him.
72
In the cab of the husband's pickup truck police found the couple's three
daughters, whom the husband had already killed.73 Despite these horrific
facts, the Court ultimately concluded that a police officer must have
discretion to find that a restraining order should not be enforced, despite
probable cause to believe that the order has been violated.74
With these shortcomings in mind, the following sections will show
how even flawed legal protections against domestic violence may be
denied to those in same-sex relationships. The following case studies will
show that LGBT victims face unique barriers to protection, in addition to
the shortcomings in domestic violence law that render all victims and
survivors vulnerable.
A. A DIFFERENT KIND OF ABUSE
Michael Richardson, a medical doctor residing in Washington, D.C.,
was involved in a live-in, romantic relationship with Aaron Easterling.75
Richardson obtained a civil protective order against Easterling under the
District's Intrafamily Offenses Act, based on allegations that Easterling
threatened to call the police to report that Richardson was spreading
communicable diseases, contacted the District's Board of Medicine to
make false statements regarding Richardson's sexual conduct, contacted
Richardson's colleagues to disclose that Richardson was homosexual and
allege he was knowingly spreading disease, and attempted to cash a forged
check in Richardson's name.76 The temporary protective order prohibited
67. Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 752.
68. Id. at 753.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 753-54.
71. Id. at 754.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 761.
75. Richardson v. Easterling, 878 A.2d 1212, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
76. Id.
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Easterling from harassing, stalking, threatening, or abusing Richardson,
and from contacting Richardson himself or his colleagues. 7
Easterling moved to strike Richardson's petition for a permanent order
arguing that, most importantly, Richardson was HIV-positive (as was
Easterling) and that he had an ethical, if not legal, duty to report
Richardson's behavior.78 Easterling additionally argued that nothing
alleged by Richardson fell within the explicit acts covered by the
Intrafamily Offenses Act.79 The trial court agreed with Easterling's second
argument and dismissed the petition. 80 The court believed it could not
issue a restraining order where "neither abuse nor violence has been
alleged.,
81
The District of Columbia's Intrafamily Offenses Act, enacted in 1994,
provides that the Family Division may issue a permanent protective order if
it finds that a criminal offense has been perpetrated by a person who is
related to the victim by blood, legal custody, marriage, having a child in
common, or having cohabited.82 The statute also covers those who are in,
or who have been in, a romantic relationship, even if not sexual, provided
the victim resides in the District and the offense took place there.83 The
Act broadly covers any act punishable as a criminal offense.84
The trial court held that Richardson had not alleged abusive or
violent conduct, and therefore failed to state a claim under which the
protective order could be granted. 85 The court reached this conclusion
even after Richardson amended his complaint to allege that Easterling
repeatedly contacted Richardson, his family, and his colleagues,
threatening to "ruin" Richardson's professional and personal life.86
Easterling allegedly demanded money, threatened to harass
Richardson in his new home, and threatened to distribute flyers and
leaflets containing scandalous accusations.87 Richardson also asserted
that Easterling would continue to contact his family, friends, and
colleagues regardless of legal proceedings, in order to let them know
"what kind of a piece of shit [Richardson] really [was]." 88 Despite this
list of allegations, the trial court concluded that the acts were
insufficiently abusive or violent to fall under the Act. 89 Rather, the
77. Richardson, 878 A.2d at 1213-14.
78. Id. at 1214-15.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1215.
81. Id. at 1216.
82. D.C. CODE § 16-1001(5)(A) (2006).
83. D.C. CODE § 16-1001(5)(B) (2006).
84. Richardson, 878 A.2d at 1216-17.
85. Id. at 1216.
86. Id. at 1215 n.4.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1216.
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court seemed to conclude that many of the actions were defamatory,
and as a result not criminal. 90
The District of Columbia Appellate Court rejected the trial court's
restrictive reading of the statute and reversed its conclusion on de novo
review. 91 It suggested that the allegations could have constituted stalking,
emotional violence, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.92 The
court agreed with the trial judge that if Richardson had alleged only that
Easterling defamed him, there would have been no criminal conduct to
invoke the Act.93 However, where the trial court saw only defamation, the
appellate court concluded there was actionable abuse.9 4
This case demonstrates one of the shortfalls of domestic violence
statutes as they are applied to same-sex relationships. Societal homophobia
is another "arsenal of terror" in a same-sex relationship. 95 Efforts to "out"
a victim may be one of the primary acts of abuse in such relationships.
Significantly, Easterling allegedly contacted Richardson's colleagues and
family members. The underlying assumption associated with Easterling's
conduct is that Richardson will lose status or prestige if he is identified as a
homosexual man, moreover, one who is HIV-positive. Abuse in
heterosexual relationships might include threats to humiliate the victim,
ruin a reputation, or disclose embarrassing information. Yet there is a
distinction between that situation and what is presented in this case.
American society does not stigmatize heterosexual relationships, it praises
and protects them.96 Easterling threatened to reveal routine information -
that Richardson had been in a relationship with him. But because of
homophobia, this revelation took on an increased abusive aspect.
Similarly, the stigma and stereotypes associated with the AIDS virus make
threats to reveal the diagnosis uniquely abusive. Richardson was able to
appeal the decision, but an individual with lesser means may not have had
the same opportunity, in which case the trial court's erroneous, rigid
understanding of the law would have stood. Ideally, homophobia would
not exist; however, so long as it does domestic violence laws should
explicitly recognize that abuse may take on the characteristics of the abuse
at issue here.
B. HOMOPHOBIA IN THE SYSTEM
Judges and police officers do not make decisions in a vacuum. Biases
against the LGBT community or misunderstandings of issues unique to
abuse in these relationships can lead to lax enforcement of restraining
90. Richardson, 878 A.2d at 1217.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1217-18.
93. Id. at 1218.
94. Id. at 1217.
95. Lundy, supra note 19, at 282.
96. Colker, supra note 7, at 1841.
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orders, issuance of mutual restraining orders, failure to recognize abuse,
and more. In this section, two case studies will explicitly demonstrate this
problem. In the first case, a trial judge bares his strong bias against
lesbians to the parties and the reviewing court. In the second, a trial judge
dismisses evidence of abuse in a gay male relationship because the abuser
had interspersed personal favors and gifts with the abuse.
While on probation for dealing in stolen property, Robbyn Rucks and
her live-in female partner's 17-year-old daughter began to argue about
chores.97 The argument became physical and the police were called.98
Rucks was charged with misdemeanor assault for domestic violence,
thereby violating the terms of her probation.99 Following an evidentiary
hearing that included conflicting testimony of whether Rucks or the
daughter had instigated the physical argument, Rucks was confined in the
local jail. l00 Rucks then filed a motion to disqualify the judge who presided
over the hearing because of remarks he made in the courtroom. After the
conclusion of testimony the judge stated, "I'll tell you, ma'am. This is a
sick situation."' 0'1 Followed by, "I've seen a lot of sick situations since I've
been in this court. I've been in this profession for 27 years and this ranks at
the top.' 10 2 He made a third similar statement and upon announcing the
sentence said, "[i]f this is the family of 1997, heaven help us.' ' 3
Florida law provides for the removal of a judge where the party shows,
through a motion and affidavit, that she has a well-founded fear that she
will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. 0 4 Rucks' motion
noted that the assault at issue inflicted only minor injuries and the dispute
was a routine one.'0 5 Aside from the homosexual nature of the relationship
underlying the dispute, what could have so severely offended the
experienced judge? The reviewing court did not directly answer that
question; it determined instead that Rucks had a reasonable apprehension
that something other than her probation violation or the argument with her
partner's daughter motivated the judge and that her fear of an unfair result
was well-founded. 1
06
Reported cases are unlikely to show such outright homophobia as this
case arguably does. However, there are examples of cases in which courts
have reached conclusions in same-sex situations that seem improbable.
Arguably, social assumptions about relationships and homosexuality
97. Rucks v. State, 692 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 977.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Cave v. State, 660 So. 2d 705, 708 (Fla. 1995)).
105. Id. at 977.
106. Id.
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underlie these anomalous decisions.
Michael Moore dated Richard Bentley, and the couple lived together in
Ohio for four months. 10 7 In a petition for a civil protective order, Moore
alleged that Bentley was continually abusive for two months of the
relationship; he threatened Moore with a knife, grabbed him by the chin,
and pushed him. 0 8  Ohio's civil domestic violence statute prohibits
recklessly causing or attempting to cause physical harm, causing child
abuse or sexual abuse, or placing another in fear of imminent serious
physical harm through threat of force.'0 9 The statute applies to family or
household members, which can include a current spouse, former spouse, or
person living as a spouse or a person linked by parentage to a current
spouse, former spouse, or person living as a spouse.'10 Moore received a
temporary protective order under the statute, but at a full hearing the court
denied him a permanent order."'
The reviewing court's short opinion does not address whether or not
Moore falls under the class of persons covered by the statute; it appears to
assume that he does. Instead, the court focuses on the alleged abuse and
upholds the trial court's determination that the weight of credible evidence
does not suggest that Moore was in fear of imminent serious physical
harm.1 2 Specifically, the court concluded:
Although appellant filed a police report stating appellee pushed
him, appellant continually brought appellee lunch, up to the day
before filing this matter, attended a public gathering together, and
bought him flowers the day prior to the filing of this action. This
behavior undermines a finding that appellant was in fear of
imminent serious physical harm.1'3
As in Rucks, it is difficult to speculate on the court's exact motivations.
Here, the reviewing court was bound by the rule that "judgments supported
by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of
the case will not be reversed."'"14 Given the evidence on de novo review,
the court may have decided the outcome differently. Nevertheless, it
upheld a determination that Bentley could rebut evidence of abuse by
showing that Moore continued to interact with Bentley despite Moore's
claims of abuse."l 5 This understanding of domestic violence represents an
107. Moore v. Bentley, No. 03-AP-1003, 2004 WL 2804785, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 23, 2004).
108. Id.
109. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (A)(1) (West 2005).
110. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (A)(3) (West 2005).
111. Moore, 2004 WL 2804785 at *1.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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out-dated belief that an abuser can never present a calm front and that
physical abuse must be constant. Courts have not required that survivors of
domestic violence in heterosexual relationships show such an extreme level
of abuse to qualify for protective orders. On the contrary, research
indicates that abuse often occurs in cycles, with periods of abuse followed
by "honeymoon" periods, where the abuser will apologize, attempt to gain
forgiveness, and promise to cease the abusive behavior."
6
These cases demonstrate what anecdotal evidence has suggested,"
7
that homophobia operates to further distance an LGBT domestic violence
survivor from support structures or legal protection. Judges and juries do
not act in complete isolation from their personal biases. Absent explicit
language mandating that domestic violence laws apply with equal force to
relationships of all sexualities, these biases will present barriers to LGBT
victims. It is vital that laws address - and, where possible, dismantle -
the additional hurdles facing LGBT abuse survivors.
C. RIGID FORMALISM - AMBIGUITY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Berkley C. Nixon was indicted in 2005 for violating Ohio's criminal
domestic violence statute, resisting arrest, and obstructing official
business." 8 The indictment arose from an incident involving his live-in
girlfriend, in which he allegedly knowingly caused or attempted to cause
physical harm to a household or family member." 9 Nixon pled not guilty
and moved to dismiss the domestic violence charge, claiming it was
unconstitutional in light of the state constitution's Marriage Protection
Amendment. 20  The trial court denied his motion, finding orally on the
record that the domestic violence statute was constitutional; Nixon then
pled no contest to the charges and was sentenced.'
21
Nixon refined his argument on appeal, arguing that the statute violated
the constitutional amendment, which states:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage
valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions.
This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize
116. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95-97 (Springer
Publishing Company 1984). See also Sara Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for
Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 217 (2003)
(referring to Walker's cycle of violence theory). While acknowledging and agreeing with
arguments that gender stereotyping inherent in the Battered Woman Syndrome theory limit
its usefulness, and noting that every relationship will not exhibit the three stages -
escalation, abuse, honeymoon - this Note merely points out that courts have consistently
recognized the ups-and-downs of abusive relationships in contexts different from that
presented here.
117. Lundy, supra note 19, at 287-88.
118. State v. Nixon, 845 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends
to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage. 122
The Ohio criminal domestic violence statute, similar to the civil statute
at issue in Rucks, prohibits abuse of a family or household member. 123
"Family or household member" is further defined as a current or former
spouse, a person living as spouse, or a parent or child of one of those
persons, any of whom must reside or have resided with the offender. 124
"Person living as a spouse" is a "person who is living or has lived with the
offender in a common law marital relationship, who otherwise is cohabiting
with the offender, or who otherwise has cohabited with the offender within
five years prior to the date of the alleged commission of the act in
question. 1 25  The appellate court for Ohio's Ninth Appellate District
agreed with the trial court that the amendment and the domestic violence
statute could coexist.126 The amendment related to the legal status of
marriage as an institution, but for the purposes of the domestic violence
law, marriage as a legal institution is immaterial. 127 The court found that
Nixon and his girlfriend were "living as" spouses, so as to fall under the
statute, but found that this statutory requirement was "merely descriptive in
character."12 8 The identification did not create a legal status intending to
approximate marriage. 129 The court emphasized that the purpose of the
statute was to hold abusers accountable and provide protections for victims,
whether they are heterosexual or homosexual. 130  The purposes of the
Marriage Protection Amendment would be thwarted only if the statute
attempted to "infringe on the significance or effect of the institution of
marriage itself."1
31
Other Ohio appellate courts have reached conclusions that differ from
the court in State v. Nixon. In March 2006, the Second Appellate District
held that the clause of the criminal statute on domestic violence extending
protection to a "person living as a spouse" violated the Marriage Protection
Amendment. 132  There, Karen Ward challenged her indictment for
assaulting her live-in boyfriend, using arguments similar to those made by
Berkley Nixon.1 33 The court held that the statute bestowed a benefit of
122. OHIO CONST. ART. XV, § 11.
123. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(A) (West 2006).
124. Id. § 2919.25(F)(2).
125. Id.
126. Nixon, 845 N.E.2d at 547.
127. Id. at 547-48.
128. Id. at 548.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 548-49.
131. Id. at 549.
132. State v. Ward, 166 Ohio App. 3d 188, 196 (2006).
133. Id. at 189.
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marriage, namely protections against domestic violence. This violated the
constitutional amendment's prohibition on giving such status to
relationships approximating "the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage."' 34 Holding otherwise would give no meaning to the second
sentence of the Amendment and create an unworkable jurisprudence. The
court envisioned that piecemeal recognition of non-traditional spouses
would lead to a point in which the only privilege of marriage reserved for
actual married couples would be an income tax reduction."l 5 The court
reasoned that the factors used to identify persons living as spouses
essentially define a marriage relationship. 36 Therefore, the protections
granted through the domestic violence statute are exactly the type of state
recognition that the citizens of Ohio intended to prohibit. 37 The court
suggested that most relationships covered by the clause could be included
under other clauses of the statute, and further suggested that the General
Assembly amend the statute to protect "persons sharing residential
quarters,"' 138 thereby reaching the quasi-marital relationships that the clause
was intended to cover.
The decision in State v. Ward has since been appealed, and a motion to
certify was granted on August 2, 2006.139 The Ohio situation presents a
double whammy to LGBT victims of domestic violence. In states where
constitutional amendments bar the legal recognition of LGBT relationships
through marriage, it can be concluded that protection by way of criminal
and civil domestic violence statutes will be unavailable. 140  Similarly, if
current statutory language limits the right to marry, the rule of
interpretation that assumes more recent statutes trump older ones may be
read to limit protection under domestic violence laws. The court in Nixon
held the purpose of the Marriage Protection Amendment was to prohibit
state recognition of same-sex marriage and to stave off court decisions such
as Goodrich v. Department of Health, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
case that extended marriage to same-sex partners. 41  The Marriage
Protection Amendment was to have no bearing on criminal laws.
142
However, one of the privileges of marriage is protection from abuse by a
partner through the civil system; a privilege that some courts have held
cannot be extended to same-sex partnerships.
134. Ward, 166 Ohio App. 3d at 193.
135. Id. at 193-94.
136. Id. at 195.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. State v. Ward, 110 Ohio St. 3d 1438 (2006).
140. Ohio's civil and criminal domestic violence statutes use the same definition of
"family or household member" to define the parameters of the laws. See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2919.25, 3113.31 (West 2006).
141. State v. Nixon, 845 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
142. Id.
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Ohio's Supreme Court responded to more than twenty cases, including
State v. Ward, on the issue in In re Ohio Domestic-Violence Statute
Cases. 143 The Court held that the domestic violence law and constitutional
amendment were not in conflict. 144  It reasoned that the amendment
prohibited the state from bestowing new legal rights or creating legal
relationships approximating the design, quality, or significance of
marriage. 145 The domestic violence statute did not create any additional
legal rights or benefits, but rather created a subset of potential victims.
146
Therefore, the statute did not establish a "quasi-marital relationship" that
violated the purposes of the marriage amendment.
147
Although Ohio courts have resolved this issue in favor of protection,
Ohio is not the only state facing this legal situation. Pennsylvania, Indiana,
and West Virginia each have statutes covering domestic violence that
occurs in the context of a "spouse-like" relationship. 148 All three also
prohibit same-sex marriage by statute, although not by constitutional
amendment. 1
49
Virginia's Attorney General issued a pre-emptive policy opinion at the
request of lawmakers at the same time the state legislature was considering
a constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex unions. 5 °  The
amendment, which was passed and chaptered in May 2006, prohibits the
state from creating or recognizing "a legal status for relationships of
unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, or
effects of marriage," or from creating or recognizing "another union,
partnership, or other legal status" with the rights, benefits, or effects of
marriage. 151 Virginia also has statutes prohibiting marriage between people
of the same sex, civil unions, or other partnerships purporting to bestow the
privileges of marriage on same-sex couples. 152  Virginia's domestic
violence statute protects spouses or former spouses and people who are
cohabitating.153  The Attorney General reasoned that in extending
protections to cohabitants, the Virginia Legislature clearly "wished to
establish a new and distinct class of potential domestic violence victims
143. In re Ohio Domestic-Violence Statute Cases, 872 N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio 2007).
144. State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ohio 2007).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 553.
147. Id. at 554.
148. Colker, supra note 7, at 1859.
149. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1102, 1704 (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (2004). See also Colker, supra
note 7, at 1890-97.
150. 2006 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 34 (2006) available at http://www.oag.state.va.us/
opinions/2006opns/06-003Newmanetal.pdf.
151. 2006 H.J. Res. 41, 2006 sess. (Va. 2006), available at http://legl.state.va.us/
cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=061 &typ=bil&val=hj41.
152. 2006 Op. Va. Att'y Gen., supra note 150, at 7-8.
153. Id. at 26-27.
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among unmarried, cohabitating persons other than spouses."' 154 According
to the opinion, this statute is not a recognition of common-law marriage,
which is illegal in Virginia, and is similarly not a recognition of same-sex
marriage.155 The opinion notes that the argument raised in Ohio's Ward
case could not be made in Virginia because Virginia's domestic violence
statute does not "provide for the establishment of common-law marriage or
any other 'quasi-marital relationship' within the Commonwealth," in that it
does not contain "living as spouse" language.
156
The constitutional issues raised in Ohio and Virginia are graphic
illustrations of the dangers of creating vague, yet rigid, definitions of
victims and perpetrators whom domestic violence laws cover. Courts
appear to have little discretion under such laws. Parties are included or
they are not. Nothing in the statutes permits courts to extend jurisdiction
over unlisted relationships in the interest of safety, justice, or to enforce
lawmakers' intentions to prevent abuse. However, because the legislatures
have not clearly stated whom these statutes intend to include, courts read
the open-ended words of the statutes to confer the benefits of marriage on
unmarried couples, violating the state constitution. These efforts to make
the laws more general and gender neutral has turned out to give less
protection for heterosexual and non-heterosexual victims of abuse.
V. CREATING EFFECTIVE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAWS
Existing domestic violence statutes fall short of protecting those in
abusive LGBT relationships due to homophobia and lack of understanding
within law enforcement and legal systems, unique forms of abuse, social
sentiment against state recognition of LGBT relationships, and
constitutional conflict. Vague notions of spouse-like persons, household
members, and dating relationships may be broadly interpreted to include a
variety of relationships, but may also provide outs for a court to exclude
victims at will.
What, then, would be a better system? If state legislatures are
committed to providing the best available protection to all members of
society, they must do so explicitly. Statutes should be amended to
explicitly cover both opposite-sex and same-sex relationships.
Furthermore, definitions of abuse should clarify that abuse may involve any
combination of physical abuse and stalking, harassment, emotional and
economic control, and isolation. Domestic violence statutes have already
been amended to broaden their reach, generally by adding language. For
example, California revised its civil domestic violence protections in
154. 2006 Op. Va. Att'y Gen., supra note 150, at 30.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 32 n.58.
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1993.' At that point, it added the terms "dating relationship" so that the
civil and criminal statutes would be in agreement.' 58 The legislature also
added a section explicitly covering children. 59 The Commission notes
explain that this addition clarified the former law, which covered children
more obliquely through the word "cohabitant."' 60 States could use similar
reasoning to amend domestic violence statutes so that they include "a
person of the same or different sex from the perpetrator, with whom the
perpetrator has or has had an intimate relationship." States could also
follow the federal government's lead and extend coverage to "intimate
partners" of any gender.
Additionally, the type of abuse covered should be more
comprehensive. California's Domestic Violence Prevention Act takes the
positive step of listing many acts that should be considered abuse,
including stalking and making harassing telephone calls. 16 The District of
Columbia's Intrafamily Offenses Act, at issue in Richardson v. Easterling,
incorporates stalking in its definition of violence. 62 There is always a
danger that a court will conclude a situation does not involve the type of
abuse covered by the statute, as the trial court concluded in Dr.
Richardson's situation in Richardson.163 However, in that case the statute's
broad coverage created the platform on which the reviewing court could
base its reversal. Phone calls and threats that did not appear abusive to the
lower court fell clearly into the language of the statute, and were therefore
a basis for a restraining order. 1
64
Efforts to explicitly cover all relationships are likely to inspire political
opposition. Nancy Knauer notes that anti-gay activists have argued that
domestic violence laws that include same-sex relationships legitimize and
impart special rights on those relationships. 165 Such arguments find their
basis in history and tradition, the Bible, statutory and constitutional bans on
same-sex marriage, and laws criminalizing sodomy.' 66  The Family
Research Council, an organization that champions the institutions of
traditional family and marriage, cites data showing high rates of domestic
violence in lesbian and gay male relationships to buttress its conclusion that
"'committed' homosexual relationships are radically different from married
couples in several key respects .... ,,167
157. CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6211 Law Revision Commission Cmts. (Deering 2007).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203 (West 2004); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2008).
162. D.C. CODE § 16-1001(5) (2006).
163. Richardson v. Easterling, 878 A.2d 1212, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
164. Id. at 1217.
165. Knauer, supra note 22, at 339.
166. Id.
167. Timothy Dailey, Comparing the Lifestyles of Homosexual Couples to Married
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Opposition from conservative circles should not discourage lawmakers
from ensuring that the protections they have already decided to extend to
same-sex relationships are effective. Lawmakers have often made strong
statements that domestic violence of any kind should not be tolerated. For
example, when the Colorado legislature passed its mandatory arrest
legislation, at issue in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, discussed above,
one legislator stated, "the entire system must send the same message...
[that] violence is criminal. 168 Prior to the court's opinion upholding state
domestic violence laws, newspaper editorials in Ohio decried the fact that
abuse survivors were unable to gain protection under the domestic violence
law. The Columbus Dispatch urged adoption of an amendment that would
have altered the problematic "living as a spouse" language to read "any
person who is residing with the offender.' 69 Similarly, the Cincinnati
Enquirer decried the fact that the marriage ban was used to undermine
domestic violence laws that had been in place for years. 170 It quoted
approvingly a determination by a Cuyahoga County judge that in extending
protections to same-sex relationships, "the legislature 'merely
acknowledged the reality that, with or without official approval, human
beings in Ohio, as elsewhere, will come together in a variety of loving
relationships that will sometimes turn violent.' 17' Lawmakers
campaigning on "tough on crime" platforms cannot turn their backs on
crime victims because of stereotyped impressions of the relationships in
which the victims are involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is an unfortunate reality in some LGBT
relationships, just as it is within heterosexual relationships. However, the
abuse in these relationships cannot be dealt with by adding an asterisk to
domestic violence laws based on heterosexual norms. Societal
homophobia, dynamics within the LGBT community, and gender issues
make LGBT domestic violence unique. Although gender-neutral domestic
violence laws have the positive impact of including some same-sex
domestic violence within their broad (and often flawed) protections, this is
an imperfect solution. Unique forms of abuse that may arise in same-sex
relationships and homophobia among judges and law enforcement must be
addressed. Moreover, recently enacted statutes and constitutional
amendments banning same-sex marriage threaten to withdraw protections
Couples (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IS04C02.
168. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 n.6 (2005).
169. Don't Protect Abusers: Domestic Violence Law Must Be Changed So Assaults
Bring Tougher Sentences, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 9, 2005, at 16A.
170. Editorial, Clarify Domestic Violence Laws, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 28,
2005, at 14B.
171. Id.
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from LGBT relationships as well as heterosexual, unmarried partners.
Lawmakers must face this issue head on. Rigid, formalistic laws that
contain vague terms of protection will always be vulnerable to
interpretations that leave certain populations out of their scope. If state
legislators are truly committed to preventing violence they must explicitly
say so, ensuring that the laws they craft will be truly effective.
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